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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATif. OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAN GEORGE HANSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12940 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~IENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty to 
the crime of second degree burglary. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found the appellant guilty of burglary 
in the second degree in the Third J u<licial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on March 
10, rn72. Appellant was sentenced to serve the inde-
terminate sentence as provided by law. 
UELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
2 
Third .J wlicial District Court, Honorable .T oscph G. 
Jeppson, Judge, should Le affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF TIIE FACTS 
Respondent stipulates to appellant's statement of 
the facts except as follows: 
On gaining entry to the market, one officer pro-
ceeded to search the attic and found the appellant in a 
ventilator shaft with only his shoes and buttocks visible 
( 63). The appellant had apparently gained entrance to 
the lmilcling· hy smashing a hole in its roof which was 
constrncte<l out of wood and tar ( H5) . 
. Appellant took the stand and con firmed that at the 
time of his arrest on the instant charge he was on pro· 
hation for a second degree burglary conviction in 1970 
( D7, lOD). He claimed that on the night in question he 
Juul taken hrn LSD and two sleeping tablets (98). No 
one saw him ingest the tablets which he claimed to have 
done at about 9:00 p.m. (107, llO). Shortly thereafter 
the appellant, drin·n by a friend, proceeded into down· 
town Salt Lake City where he allegedly began having 
hallucinations in which he saw castles ( 104<). The ap· 
pella11t a11cl his companion arrived in the vicinity of the 
market approximately one hour later whereupon the 
appellant asked to be dropped off ( 106). Appellant 
testified that he was familiar with the market since he 
had shopped there on other occasions ( 103-04). 
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J\ state toxicologist thought it quite probable that 
a t wo-tahlet <lose of both LSD and barhituates, if actual-
ly taken and of the typical potency, would cause sub-
stantial disarrangement ( 121). He cautioned, however, 
that the effect of harbituates and LSD taken in com-
bination was still open to question and that his opinion 
was therefore purely spectulative (119). 
The three anesting officers offered generally cor-
roborating testimony as to appellant's mental and physi-
<'al capacity. The first officer testified that the appel-
lant acted "strange" ( 6()), but that he did appear to 
lun-e control of his body ( 70). He testified under cross-
examination that the reactions of LSD users were dif-
ficult to predict since he had observed so many varied 
responses ( 77). The second officer also testified that 
appellant's physical ability seemed unimpaired and add-
erl that appellant seemed unresponsive to directions 
(DO) . The third officer confirmed the fact that the ap-
pellant whimpered and babbled on the way to the police 
station ( 127), hut he did think that appellant under-
stood on being questioned and being given the Miranda 
warning (123-25). 
The state introduced a small hacksaw, a tire iron, 
a pair of gloves, a flashlight and a pair of pliers into 
evidence-all allegedly used by appellant on the night 
in question. All but the last two exhibits were admitted 
(63, 73-74). The store manager testified that the ciga-
rette cartons which had been removed from the front of 
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the store were neatly stacked in a large cardboard box 
next to the rear door ( 82-8:3). Ile noted further that 
two auxiliary drawers in each of two cash registers had 
been pried upon ( 80) awl that a desk had been broken 
into and its contents scattered ( 81). 
ARGUnlENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT UELO\V DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S RE-
(~UESTED INSTRUCTION l~,OR Tll}~ LESS-
ER OFFENSE OF UNLA \VFUL ENTRY. THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SI-IOULD l3E 
FPHRLD ON ONE OF T\VO ALTERNATIVE 
GROUNDS: 
A. UNLA"\YFUL ENTRY IS NOT A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE 
CRil\lE Olj' SECO~D DEGREE BURGLARY. 
To be "necessarily included' in the offense charged, 
the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to 
commit the greater without having first committed the 
lesser. Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 
19()1). This rule has been consistently followed by this 
Court. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 
(1970); State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371P.2d27 
(1962); State v. TVoolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 
( 1934). The 1'Voolman court stated the rule with some-
what greater particularity: 
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The only way this matter [whether or not one 
offense is included in another] may be deter-
mined is by discoverning all of the elements 
required hy the respective sections, comparing 
them and by a process of inclusion and exclu-
sion determine those common and those not 
common, and if the greater offense includes all 
the legal and factual elements, it may safely 
be said that the greater includes the lesser. 84 
Utah at 35, 33 P.2d at 645. 
'Vhen this test is applied to Utah's second degree 
burglary and unlawful entry statutes, it is apparent 
that they differ in one very significant respect: burglary 
requires that the intent "to commit larceny or any other 
felony" be proved, whereas unlawful entry, requires 
only that the intent "to damage property or to injure a 
person or annoy the peace and quiet .... " be established. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 ( 1953) with Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-9 (Supp. 1971). It is submitted that 
the difference in the intent requirement between the 
two crimes precludes the one crime from being necessar-
ily inclmled in the other under the test set forth above. 
State v. I1adley, 364 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. 1963), 
stands for exactly this proposition. In Hadley, the ap-
pellant was convicted of attempted burglary. On appeal, 
he assigned error to the trial court's failure to instruct 
the jury on a lesser charge of breaking and entering 
which required the intent to "injure or destroy" prop-
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erty. The ~Tissouri Court, noting that the burglary 
charge required an intent ''to steal or commit any 
crime .... '', hel<l that the malicious destruction or in-
j ming of property is not a lesser included of fcnse of 
second degree burglary. 3G4< S.,V.2d at 517. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court expressed a similar conclusion by 
way of dictum in People v. Proctor, 4G Cal.2d 481, 296 
P.2d 821 (Hl56). State v. Garrett, 2G3 N.C. 754, 140 
S.E.2d 311 (19()5) is also on point. In Garrett the court 
noted that: 
The charges of house breaking for the purpose 
of committing a felony do not include malicifJus 
or intentional injury to the buildings as lesser 
offenses. 140 S.E.2<1 ·at 315. 
'Vhile this Court has never expressly addressed it-
self' to this narrow issue, it appears to he in substantial 
agreement "·ith the governing principles. In /•)tate v. 
Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 45G P.2d 154 (1969), for example, 
the eourt held that the unlawful taking offense was not 
neeessarily included within the grand larceny charge, 
suggesting that the difference in the specific intent re· 
quirements for the respective crimes was decisive of the 
issue. The court said: 
In the instant case the jury found the appel-
lant guilty of intending to deprive the owner 
permanently of the use of his car, and we can-
not see why they should also have been re-
quired to decide if he only intended to deprive 
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the owner temporarily. 11he two crimes are 
based in contrarlJ intentions in the mind of the 
defendant. 2:3 Utah 2d at 16 (emphasis added); 
accord, Sandoval v. People, 490 P.2d 1298 
(Colo. 1971). 
The reasoning in Ash and the other cases herein cited 
compels the conclusion that differences in specific in-
tent requirements constitute materially significant dis-
tinctions between cl·imes. liencc, under the Utah rule, 
it is impossible that the crime of unlawful entry be neces-
sarily includetl in the charge of second degree burglary. 
B. ASSUl\IING AHGUENDO THAT THE 
OFFENSE. OF UNLA "TFUL ENTRY IS IN-
CLl TDED IN THE CHARGE OF SECOND DE-
UREE BlJUGLARY, A UEASONABLE VIEW 
OF TIIE EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY 
THE SUBl\IISSION OF THE REQUESTED 
IXSTRUCTJON ON THE LESSER INCLUD-
E]) OFFENSE TO THE JURY. 
The general rule followed in this state is that a trial 
court need not in every case instruct on lesser included 
crimes; it must do so only where, under some reason-
able view of the evidence, there is a basis for finding 
the accused innocent of the higher crime and yet guilty 
of the lower one. See State v. Gillian, supra; State v . 
.Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947). This rule 
has also been embodied in our statutes. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-33-6 ( 1953). Appellant cites a number of cases 
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whieh generally support this rnle hut none of whieh sug-
gest how it should he applied in the case at bar. l\Iore 
specifically, appellant fails to come to grips with the 
narrow issue now before this court: wouhl the evidence 
a<1ducell lrnve rcasonabl,ll led the jury or the court to con-
clwle that the appellant was innocent of second degree 
burglary and yet guilty of unlawful entry'? 
There are two Utah cases which suggest the out-
lines of a possible standard against which the facts of 
this case can he tested. In short, that standard is that 
the eourt will not i1u1nlge ev-ery presumption in favor 
o t' instructing on the lesser offense; rather, it will in-
• 
1 
.. : : l Ji;. 1efenrl:mt cle:irly show that he has su hstan-
tia I reasonable grounds for requesting the instruction. 
1 " .. , , . .1.J<ulge, 18 Utah 2d G3, 415 P.2d 212 (l!">GG), 
the defendant was caught in the act of breaking into a 
safe. Ile was convicted arnl appealed, claiming that 
the trial court cne<l in not instructing the jury on the 
offense of unlawful entry. The Dod~c court dill not 
reach the issue of whether unla\'dul entry was an in-
cluded offense of burglary. Instead, it was content to 
ohsene that the jury would have been composed of un-
reasonable men had it even considered that the def en<l-
ant entered with the "altruistic intent to damage prop-
erty or to injure a person or annoy the peace .... " and 
that the court would hnse acted just as unreasonably 
had it given such an instruction. 18 Utah 2<l at 64-65. 
In State v. JlcCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 
( 1971), defendant was caught in the act of stealing 
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twcntr-three hams from a supermarket. Nineteen hams 
Juul been earried away from the store's meat department 
and another four ha<l heen placed in a box nearby. The 
clc /'c11da11 t was convicted of grand larceny and appealed, 
claiming that the trial court erred in not instructing the 
jury on the lesser offense of petit larcency. The court 
rejected this argument, reasoning, as it had in Dodge, 
that the evidence was illsufficient to support the conten-
tion. 
The instant case is very similar to Dodge and 
,;lfd'arfh/f in that the oYerwhelming weight of evidence 
points to the appellant's guilt of the greater offense. 
The appellant had smashed a hole in the market's roof 
alHl had apparently brought along instruments with 
\\'hieh to aceoplish that task. The court might at this 
juncture profitably note People v. II enderso11,, 138 Cal. 
A pp.2d 5ot), 2!)2 P .2d 267 ( ID5G), wherein the Cali-
fornia court suggests that "burglarious intent could be 
infcned from the forcible and unlawful entry alone." 
2!)2 P .2d at 2GD. Furthermore, appellant was appre-
hended while trying to force a door through which he 
could carry his booty of cigarettes, having failed in still 
other attempts to pry open two cash registers or to find 
other more valuable items in the store manager's desk. 
On these facts, the court below would have been indulg-
ing the most tenuous of prescumptions to consider that 
the appellant had other than felonious intentions. 
The only remaining question is whether the jury, 
IO 
011 taking a reasonable view of the evidence, would haYe 
been able lo find the appellant innocent of burglary 
and guilty of unlawful <:ntry hecause of the conflicting 
evidence on appellant's rnelltal competence at the time 
of the crime. The state intrnduccd eviclence that, if be-
lie\·ecl by the jury, would have led to the conclusion that 
the appellant, although acting strange, had sufficient 
ability to formulate burglarious iritent. The defense, 
011 the other hand, introduced evidc11ce that, if hclievecl, 
would have established that the appellant was co111plctcly 
irrcs1>011siblc. In short, the jur~T was presented with one 
of' two choi<"es: appellant wa" either guilty or innocent 
of sccornl degree burglary. Given the fact that appel-
lant made 110 attempt to show that grounds existed for 
reaching some intermediate conclusion, the trial court 
was correct in refusing to complicate the jury's choice 
by dangling another, unexplored alternative before it. 
Cf. State v. Gillian, supra, Ellet, J., dissenting. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the court below prop-
erly refused to give appellant's requested instructions. 
Respondent therefore respectfully requests that the 
verdict and judg1nent of the Third Judicial District 
Court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. RO:l\INEY 
Attorne,y General 
11 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for Respandent 
